On 29 May, 1861, Irvin McDowell was given command of the Army of the
Potomac, which consisted of about 30,000 men, who, with the exception of 700 or
800 regulars, were almost entirely raw recruits. With these troops, in response
to the public demand for some immediate action, he was ordered, on 16 July, to
march against the Confederate army, posted at Manassas Junction under General
Beauregard. His plan of campaign had been carefully studied out, and its
principal feature was to turn the enemy's left flank while threatening the
front, which was well posted behind Bull Run on an elevation that commanded the
entire plateau. A preliminary action, without the authority of General McDowell,
took place at Blackburn's Ford on the lath, and developed the fact that the
Confederates were strongly entrenched.
The National troops, unable to carry the masked batteries, fell back to
Centreville, where they rested during the two following days. On the morning of
the 21st the National army crossed the run and succeeded in throwing the enemy's
left into such confusion that the presence of Generals Beauregard and Johnston
was necessary to rally their troops, who then re-formed in line on the crest of
the hill. A severe struggle for this position ensued, and it was lost and won
three times, and about three o'clock in the afternoon it remained in the control
of the National forces. But soon after that hour fresh Confederate
re-enforcements arrived and completely turned the tide of battle. McDowell's
men, who had been on their feet since two o'clock in the morning, who had
marched twelve miles to the field and been engaged in heavy fighting since ten
o'clock, were now exhausted by fatigue and want of food and water. Unable to
withstand the fierce attack of fresh troops, they broke and retired in confusion
down the hillside and made a disorderly retreat to Washington. Thus the first
great battle of the civil war was fought and lost.
According to General Sherman, "it was one of the best-planned
battles, but one of the worst fought." Heavy losses of artillery and
other war-supplies were experienced as the soldiers fell back on the capital.
Both armies were fairly defeated, and whichever had stood fast the other would
have run. General Johnston says: "The Confederate army was more
disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat."
Northern Virginia Theater in July 1861.
Confederate Union
Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell was appointed by
President
Abraham Lincoln to command the
Army of Northeastern Virginia. Once in this capacity, McDowell was
harassed by impatient politicians and citizens in Washington, who wished to
see a quick battlefield victory over the Confederate Army in northern
Virginia.
McDowell, however, was concerned about the untried nature of his army. He was
reassured by
Maj. Gen.
Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of the U.S. Army, "You are green, it is
true, but they are green also; you are all green alike."[2]
Against his better judgment, McDowell commenced campaigning. On
July 16,
1861, the general
departed Washington with the largest field army yet gathered on the
North American continent, about 35,000 men (28,452 effectives).[3]
McDowell's plan was to move westward in three columns, make a diversionary
attack on the Confederate line at
Bull Run with two columns, while the third column moved around the
Confederates' right flank to the south, cutting the railroad to
Richmond and threatening the rear of the rebel army. He assumed that the
Confederates would be forced to abandon Manassas Junction and fall back to the
Rappahannock River, the next defensible line in Virginia, which would
relieve some of the pressure on the U.S. capital.[4]
After two days of marching slowly in the sweltering heat, the Union army
was allowed to rest in
Centreville. McDowell reduced the size of his army to approximately 30,000
by dispatching Brig. Gen.
Theodore Runyon with 5,000 troops to protect the army's rear. In the
meantime, McDowell searched for a way to
outflank Beauregard, who had drawn up his lines along Bull Run. On
July 18,
the Union commander sent a
division under Brig. Gen.
Daniel Tyler to pass on the Confederate right (southeast) flank. Tyler was
drawn into a
skirmish at Blackburn's Ford over Bull Run and made no headway.
Becoming more frustrated, McDowell resolved to attack the Confederate left
(northwest) flank instead. He planned to attack with Brig. Gen.
Daniel Tyler's division at the
Stone Bridge on the
Warrenton Turnpike and send the divisions of Brig. Gens.
David
Hunter and
Samuel P. Heintzelman over Sudley Springs Ford. From here, these divisions
could march into the Confederate rear. The brigade of
Col.
Israel B. Richardson (Tyler's Division) would harass the enemy at
Blackburn's Ford, preventing them from thwarting the main attack. Patterson
would tie down Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley so that reinforcements could
not reach the area. Although McDowell had arrived at a theoretically sound
plan, it had a number of flaws: it was one that required synchronized
execution of troop movements and attacks, skills that had not been developed
in the nascent army; it relied on actions by Patterson that he had already
failed to take; finally, McDowell had delayed long enough that Johnston's
Valley force was able to board trains at Piedmont Station and rush to Manassas
Junction to reinforce Beauregard's men.[6]
On July 19
and July 20,
significant reinforcements bolstered the Confederate lines behind Bull Run.
Johnston arrived with all of his army, except for the troops of Brig. Gen.
Kirby Smith, who were still in transit. Most of the new arrivals were
posted in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford and Beauregard's plan was to attack
from there to the north toward Centreville. Johnston, the senior officer,
approved the plan. If both of the armies had been able to execute their plans
simultaneously, it would have resulted in a mutual counterclockwise movement
as they attacked each other's left flank.[7]
McDowell was getting contradictory information from his intelligence
agents, and so he called for the balloon
Enterprise, which was being demonstrated by Prof.
Thaddeus S. C. Lowe in Washington, to perform aerial reconnaissance.
On the morning of
July 21,
McDowell sent the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (about 12,000 men) from
Centreville at 2:30 a.m., marching southwest on the Warrenton Turnpike and
then turning northwest towards Sudley Springs. Tyler's division (about 8,000)
marched directly towards the Stone Bridge. The inexperienced units immediately
developed logistical problems. Tyler's division blocked the advance of the
main flanking column on the turnpike. The latter units found the approach
roads to Sudley Springs were inadequate, little more than a cart path in some
places, and did not begin fording Bull Run until 9:30 a.m. Tyler's men reached
the Stone Bridge around 6 a.m.[8]
At 5:15 a.m., Richardson's brigade fired a few artillery rounds across
Mitchell's Ford on the Confederate right, some of which hit Beauregard's
headquarters in the
Wilmer McLean house as he was eating breakfast, alerting him to the fact
that his offensive battle plan had been preempted. Nevertheless, he ordered
demonstration attacks north toward the Union left at Centreville. Bungled
orders and poor communications prevented their execution. Although he intended
for Brig. Gen.
Richard S. Ewell to lead the attack, Ewell, at Union Mills Ford, was
simply ordered to "hold ... in readiness to advance at a moment's notice."
Brig. Gen.
D.R. Jones was supposed to attack in support of Ewell, but found himself
moving forward alone. Holmes was also supposed to support, but received no
orders at all.[9]
Federal cavalry at Sudley Spring Ford.
All that stood in the path of the 20,000 Union soldiers converging on the
Confederate left flank were Col.
Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his reduced brigade of 1,100 men.[10]
Evans had moved some of his men to intercept the direct threat from Tyler at
the bridge, but he began to suspect that the weak attacks from the Union
brigade of Brig. Gen.
Robert C. Schenck were merely feints. He was informed of the main Union
flanking movement through Sudley Springs by Captain
Edward Porter Alexander, Beauregard's signal officer, observing from 8
miles southwest on Signal Hill. In the first use of
wig-wag semaphore signaling in combat, Alexander sent the message "Look
out for your left, your position is turned."[11]
Shanks hastily led 900 of his men from their position fronting the Stone
Bridge to a new location on the slopes of Matthews Hill, a low rise to the
northwest of his previous position.[10]
Evans soon received reinforcement from two other brigades under Brig. Gen.
Barnard Bee and Col.
Francis S. Bartow, bringing the force on the flank to 2,800 men.[10]
They successfully slowed Hunter's lead brigade (Brig. Gen.
Ambrose E. Burnside) in its attempts to ford Bull Run and advance across
Young's Branch, at the northern end of
Henry House Hill. One of Tyler's brigade commanders, Col.
William T. Sherman, crossed at an unguarded ford and struck the right
flank of the Confederate defenders. This surprise attack, coupled with
pressure from Burnside and
Maj.
George Sykes, collapsed the Confederate line shortly after 11:30 a.m.,
sending them in a disorderly retreat to Henry House Hill.[12]
As they retreated from their Matthews Hill position, the remainder of
Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's commands received some cover from
Capt.
John D. Imboden and his battery of four 6-pounder guns, who held off the
Union advance while the Confederates attempted to regroup on Henry House Hill.
They were met by Gens. Johnston and Beauregard, who had just arrived from
Johnston's headquarters at the M. Lewis Farm, "Portici".[13]
Fortunately for the Confederates, McDowell did not press his advantage and
attempt to seize the strategic ground immediately, choosing to bombard the
hill with the batteries of Capts.
James B. Ricketts (Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery) and
Charles Griffin (Battery D, 5th U.S.) from Dogan's Ridge.[14]
Col.
Thomas J. Jackson's Virginia brigade came up in support of the
disorganized Confederates around noon, accompanied by Col.
Wade Hampton and his
Hampton's Legion, and Col.
J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. Jackson posted his five regiments on the reverse
slope of the hill, where they were shielded from direct fire, and was able to
assemble 13 guns for the defensive line, which he posted on the crest of the
hill; as the guns fired, their recoil moved them down the reverse slope, where
they could be safely reloaded.[15]
Meanwhile, McDowell ordered the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin to move from
Dogan's Ridge to the hill for close infantry support. Their 11 guns engaged in
a fierce artillery duel across 300 yards against Jackson's 13. Unlike many
engagements in the Civil War, here the Confederate artillery had an advantage.
The Union pieces were now within range of the Confederate smoothbores and the
predominantly rifled pieces on the Union side were not effective weapons at
such close ranges, with many shots fired over the head of their targets.[16]
Ruins of Judith Henry's house, "Spring Hill", after the battle.
One of the casualties of the artillery fire was Judith Carter Henry, an
85-year-old widow and invalid, who was unable to leave her bedroom in the
Henry House. As Ricketts began receiving rifle fire, he concluded that it was
coming from the Henry House and turned his guns on the building. A shell that
crashed through the bedroom wall tore off one of the widow's feet and
inflicted multiple injuries, from which she died later that day.[17]
"The Enemy are driving us," Bee exclaimed to Jackson. Jackson, a former
U.S. Army officer and professor at the
Virginia Military Institute, is said to have replied, "Then, Sir, we will
give them the bayonet."[18]
Bee exhorted his own troops to re-form by shouting, "There is Jackson standing
like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Follow
me."[19]
There is some controversy over Bee's statement and intent, which could not be
clarified because he was mortally wounded almost immediately after speaking
and none of his subordinate officers wrote reports of the battle. Major
Burnett Rhett, chief of staff to General Johnston, claimed that Bee was angry
at Jackson's failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee's and Bartow's
brigades while they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this
opinion believe that Bee's statement was meant to be pejorative: "Look at
Jackson standing there like a stone wall!"[20]
Attacks on Henry House Hill, noon–2 p.m.
Artillery commander Griffin decided to move two of his guns to the southern
end of his line, hoping to provide
enfilade fire against the Confederates. At approximately 3 p.m., these
guns were overrun by the 33rd Virginia, whose men were outfitted in blue
uniforms, causing Griffin's commander, Maj.
William F. Barry, to mistake them for Union troops and to order Griffin
not to fire on them. Close range volleys from the 33rd Virginia and Stuart's
cavalry attack against the flank of the
11th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Ellsworth's
Fire Zouaves),
which was supporting the battery, killed many of the gunners and scattered the
infantry. Capitalizing on this success, Jackson ordered two regiments to
charge Ricketts's guns and they were captured as well. As additional Federal
infantry engaged, the guns changed hands several times.[21]
The capture of the Union guns turned the tide of battle. Although McDowell
had brought 15 regiments into the fight on the hill, outnumbering the
Confederates two to one, no more than two were ever engaged simultaneously.
Jackson continued to press his attacks, telling soldiers of the 4th Virginia
Infantry, "Reserve your fire until they come within 50 yards! Then fire and
give them the bayonet! And when you charge, yell like furies!" For the first
time, Union troops heard the disturbing sound of the
Rebel
yell. At about 4 p.m., the last Union troops were pushed off Henry House
Hill by a charge of two regiments from Col.
Philip St. George Cocke's brigade.[22]
Union retreat, after 4 p.m.
To the west, Chinn Ridge had been occupied by Col.
Oliver O. Howard's brigade from Heintzelman's division. Also at 4 p.m.,
two Confederate brigades that had just arrived from the Shenandoah Valley—Col.
Jubal A. Early's and Brig. Gen.
Kirby Smith's (commanded by Col.
Arnold Elzey after Smith was wounded)—crushed Howard's brigade. Beauregard
ordered his entire line forward. McDowell's force crumbled and began to
retreat.[23]
The retreat was relatively orderly up to the Bull Run crossings, but it was
poorly managed by the Union officers. A Union wagon was overturned by
artillery fire on a bridge spanning Cub Run Creek and incited panic in
McDowell's force. As the soldiers streamed uncontrollably toward Centreville,
discarding their arms and equipment, McDowell ordered Col.
Dixon S. Miles's division to act as a rear guard, but it was impossible to
rally the army short of Washington. In the disorder that followed, hundreds of
Union troops were taken prisoner. The wealthy elite of nearby Washington,
including congressmen and their families, expecting an easy Union victory, had
come to picnic and watch the battle. When the Union army was driven back in a
running disorder, the roads back to Washington were blocked by panicked
civilians attempting to flee in their carriages.[24]
Beauregard and Johnston did not fully press their advantage, despite urging
from
Confederate President
Jefferson Davis, who had arrived on the battlefield to see the Union
soldiers retreat
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